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From Within and From Without: 
Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences 
Olaf L. Mueller 
 
 
I. Two perspectives 
Anyone who seeks to describe reality in scientific terms may be led to ask which of the 
sentences used are made true by this reality and which sentences must already be true in 
virtue of linguistic rules alone and are therefore devoid of factual content. This is, in rough 
outline, the question concerning the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences: a 
question from the philosophy of science. The analytic/synthetic distinction can be 
conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of 
one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others.1 From without, the 
central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. 
Here we are concerned with the description of a language, i.e. a system of the linguistic 
habits of speakers.2 
 
From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a 
normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid 
talking nonsense? (Viewed from within, analytic sentences also have a further normative 
aspect: the speaker's belief system not only must be logically consistent, it also should 
contain only those beliefs that are logically consistent with all the analytic sentences in the 
speaker's repertoire). 
 
                                                 
1  For brevity's sake, I shall here restrict attention to scientific languages. The reason for this restriction will 
become clearer in sections II and IV. 
2  This view of the matter has its place within the philosophy of science with which we will here be 
concerned. Whether and, if so, how it can be applied to ordinary languages is a question that need not 
detain us here. 
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Both perspectives on analytic sentencesthe inner and the outerdo not mutually exclude 
each other. Rather, they supplement and illuminate each other. Much of what may be said 
about analytic sentences from within can be rephrased from without and thus provide a 
novel view on the topic, by making us step back as it were. Since intricate normative 
questions thereby become less important and, as we shall see, are replaced by innocuous 
questions about causal matters, this change of perspective will make disputes concerning 
analyticity more tractable: in purely descriptive terms it can be settled more easily who of 
the participants in the dispute wins her case. Obversely, what may be achieved by adopting 
the outer perspective can also be viewed from within, whence it acquires a significance for 
one's own thought and reasoning. 
 
As will become clear in what follows, I have some good news to tell about analytic 
sentences, news whose import can be appreciated while changing perspectives. Analytic 
sentences stand in need of good news. For half a century they have been subject to 
philosophical attack. Even if outside philosophy this has had no noticeable consequences,3 
analytic sentences have come in considerable disrepute. Quine's criticism of the very 
intelligibility of the analytic/synthetic distinction has dominated the discussion.4 Ever since 
then the battle has seemed to have been lost. 
 
But the need for this pessimism is only apparent, as the most important of Quine's 
arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on a mistake. The mistake can 
be identified no matter which perspective is being adopted. Before we can identify the 
mistake, we have to have a closer look at Quine's criticism. This, too, we will do by 
adopting both the inner and the outer perspective, and we shall begin by looking at the 
matter from within.  
 
 
                                                 
3  See Horwich [CvQo]:95. 
4  See Quine [TbC], [TDoE], [CLT] and [WO], chapter 2. 
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II. Quine's criticism from within 
Quine has attacked the analytic/synthetic distinction in a very specific philosophical 
context. He sought to undermine the use Russell and Carnap intended to make of analytic 
sentences.5 These thinkers intended to use the conventionally true, analytic sentences for 
the justification of other sentences: Russell and Carnap planned to justify theoretical 
sentences, that were considered as uncertain, on the basis of observation sentences, that 
were considered as certain; the analytic sentences were meant to licence the transition from 
observation to theory.6 
 
This transition was with good reason conceived as problematic. How should we ever arrive 
at empirical knowledge about, say, myons—if all we can observe is the behaviour of 
middle-sized measuring instruments in the lab? Myons are far too small and illusive to be 
observed. 
 
If we could lay down an analytic biconditional whose right-hand side referred to myons and 
whose left-hand side only contained observation terms, then the gap between observation 
and theory would be bridged. This at least was what Russell and Carnap hoped for, who 
were consequently criticized by Quine. 
 
Quine's attack was based on confirmation-holism (on the so-called Quine/Duhem thesis): a 
sentence containing theoretical termsa sentence from the center of a theory, e.g. a 
sentence about myonscannot be put to any empirical test in isolation. Only complete 
theories, i.e. totalities of a sufficiently large number of theoretical sentences standing in 
logical relations to each other, can be confronted with experience; only theories can be 
confirmed or disconfirmed empirically.7 
                                                 
5  See Horwich [CvQo]:102/3. 
6  See Russell [RoSt]; Carnap [LAW], [MP]. 
7  Cf. Duhem [ZSPT]:245-49, 266/7, 276, 290 and Quine [TDoE]:41/2; [oEES]:313; [WO]:64; [TI]:10/1; 




According to Quine, there is no hope to find an analytical biconditional of the kind that 
Russell and Carnap wanted to employ. For, such a biconditional would allow us to proceed 
from the observation of individual meter readings to theoretical claims about myons. 
Quine's criticism of this idea is compelling. Assume that in the course of an experiment we 
observe meter readings other than those predicted by our theory. Which sentence from our 
theory should we give up in these circumstances? We could give up the assumption that the 
measuring instruments in our lab function properly; we could modify our general theory of 
measurement; we could postulate factors that interfered with the measurement; we could 
revise hitherto unassailed background assumptions; or we could reject the very sentence 
that we aimed to confirm. According to Quine, it is of crucial importance to realize that our 
observations do not force any definite decision here. In the light of recalcitrant experience 
we can retain any sentence of our theory, if only we make appropriate changes elsewhere in 
the system.8 
 
So far Quine's holism merely undermines analytic reductionism. Why should it be at odds 
with the analytic/synthetic distinction in general? Here again the Quine/Duhem thesis plays 
the villain's part. If in the light of recalcitrant experience we can be led to make changes in 
a variety of different places within our theoretical system, then none of the sentences 
making up this system is sacrosanct. Which sentences we give up and which sentences we 
immunize against recalcitrant experience ultimately depends on no more than our 
theoretical preferences concerning e.g. the system's elegance, simplicity or overall 
economy. The sentences which we are not, as a matter of fact, ready to give up need not be 
analytic.9 
                                                 
8  Quine [TDoE]:43. 
9  Quine [TDoE]:43. And conversely, what qualifies as analytic and is allegedly immune to revision based 
on experience can be revised just as all the rest (Quine [TDoE]:43)—if only the resultant overall system 
fits the data in ways more elegant, simpler and more economic than its predecessor. In what follows I 




Let us consider two examples from the history of physics. My first example comes from 
Goethe's protest against the Newtonian theory of colours and light. In my reading of the 
Farbenlehre, Goethe wanted to give a repudiation not so much of Newton's theory itself 
but rather of Newton's claim to have experimentally refuted the homogeneity of the sun's 
light. Goethe thought it is impossible to produce experiments for settling questions as 
abstract as the question concerning the nature of light.10 That is to say, Goethe claimed to 
be permitted to hold the following sentence come what may: 
 
(1) The sun's white light is homogeneous (i.e., it is not composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour).  
 
Although this sentence can be immunized against recalcitrant experimental findings such as 
Newton's (and although is was immunized so by Goethe), the sentence is not analytic; it 
says something informative about the world, and thus, should be classified synthetic. 
 
You may say that Goethe's protest against Newton is not a good case of scientific 
rationality; wasn't Goethe perversely irrational in ignoring Newton's prismatic 
experiments? No; he did not ignore these experiments. He repudiated Newton's 
interpretations of the experiments. None of Newton's experiments was sufficient to force 
Goethe into giving up his firm belief in the homogeneity of light. Whatever experimental 
results had been produced by the Newtonians, Goethe was able to retain sentence (1) and 
account for recalictrant experiences by way of making changes elsewhere in his theory. 
And Goethe's adjustments for recalcitrant prismatic experiences have been far less ad hoc 
than is often assumed. For example, Goethe points out that if Newton wants to infer the 
negation of sentence (1) from prismatic experiments, i.e., if Newton wants to infer: 
 
¬(1) The sun's white light is not homogeneous, rather it is composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour, 
                                                 




then Newton has to presuppose certain abstract claims about rays of light. Now, of course, 
you cannot directly perceive rays of light; what you see in the prismatic experiments are 
coloured pictures of (at least) two dimensions.11 Nothing you can see forces you to join 
Newtonian talk about rays of light (which are supposed to be extended in one dimension 
only). But if you refuse to follow Newton's idealizations concerning rays of light, you are 
also free to reject Newton's claim ¬(1) which says that the sun's white light is composed of 
different rays of light. 
 
And again, even if you agree on the sort of mathematical idealizations which are necessary 
for Newton to get off the ground, you can still dissent from Newton's claim ¬(1). This is so 
because the claim's empirical justification depends on further background assumptions 
which were spotted by Goethe and which you can dispute if you do not wish to assent to 
Newton's claim ¬(1). The claim's justification depends on the assumption that darkness 
does not play a genuine causal role in the prismatic experiments.12 This is an assumption 
concerning the absence or presence of disturbing factors—an assumption which you cannot 
establish independently of the very prismatic experiments the assumption is made for. 
There is no experiment which forces you to believe that experiments performed in 
Newton's dark chamber are pure and undisturbed while similar experiments performed in 
daylight are impure, due to disturbing factors. You are free to repudiate such an 
assumption; and if you repudiate it, you may infer from the prismatic experiments, not that 
the sun's white light is composed of heterogenous rays (that differ as to colour and 
refrangibility), but that black darkness is composed of heterogenous rays (that differ as to 
colour and refrangibility).13 
 
                                                 
11  Goethe [LA] I 5, §217. 
12  Compare Goethe [LA] I 5, §253, §506 et passim. 
13  I shall spell out elsewhere the details of how Goethe developed the hypothesis of what one could call 
heterogeneity of darkness. 
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In sum, Newton's experimental findings alone do not and cannot possibly determine our 
thinking as to the nature of light; our scientific decision is not determined until we 
subscribe to Newton's background assumptions, such as those two which we have been 
looking at (concerning mathematical idealiziation and disturbing factors). As we are free to 
refuse subscribing to those assumptions, we are also free to dissent from Newton's 
conclusion ¬(1). To be sure, it may be more reasonable to opt in favour of Newton's theory 
of light and colour rather than in favour of Goethe's own theory. It is reasonable to opt for 
Newton's theory due to considerations of simplicity, elegance, and beauty. Even so, it is not 
(pace Newton) the experimental results alone that decide the matter. 
 
My second example is less exotic than the previous one; it concerns a scientific sentence 
that was held not by the most famous German poet of all times, but by the most famous 
physicist from the 20th century—Albert Einstein: 
 
(2) Reality is deterministic. 
 
Intuitively speaking, Einstein's sentence (2) is definitely synthetic, not analytic, because it 
has factual content; it says something informative about reality. Even so, no conceivable 
experiment can force us to give it up. For whatever the experimental results will turn out to 
be, we can always retain the sentence and account for the recalcitrant experience by making 
(if need be ad hoc) changes elsewhere in our theory. Einstein has done so until the very end 
of his life.14 
 
Accordingly, recalcitrant experience leaves Einstein's sentence unassailed in the very same 
way as in case of Goethe's sentence; both sentences can be held true come what may, and 
thus, seem to behave like analytic sentences. But according to our semantic intuitions, the 
two sentences are still synthetic, not analytic. For this reason, or so Quine argues, the 
intuitive distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences cannot coherently be drawn. 
                                                 




Quine's conclusion is of course premature. Until now only a weaker claim has been 
established. It has merely been shown that the following criterion does not suffice for the 
demarcation of analytic sentences:  
 
(D1c) A sentence is confirmation-analytic if it is confirmed come what may (i.e. if I 
am permitted to retain it under any experiential conditions, or alternatively, if no 
conceivable experience refutes it).  
 
In this definition I have prefixed the term with which we are primarily concerned, i.e. 
"analytic", with the term "confirmation" in order to highlight that the definition only 
indicates one possible way in which the concept of analyticity might be thought to be 
understood, a way that Quine has indeed shown us to lead nowhere. 
 
 
III. Change of perspective 
Let us briefly summarize the results of the preceding section. According to confirmation-
holism, the definition of confirmation-analyticity (D1c) does not yield an adequate 
explication of our intuitive notion of analyticity. Why not? Because the concept of 
analyticity is less comprehensive than that of confirmation-analyticity. The sentences: 
 
(1) The sun's white light is homogeneous (i.e., it is not composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour); 
(2) Reality is deterministic,  
 
could be confirmation-analytic; but they certainly are not analytic. 
 
Can we improve upon the definition of confirmation-analyticity, making the concept it 
defines less comprehensive so as to avoid the problems that holism saddled us with? Thus 
far, Quine's argument does not rule out such an improvement. This finding, however, at 
most suffices to establish parity. A defendant of the analytic/synthetic distinction would 
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have won his case only if he could present a definition of analyticity that yields the correct 
results even under the constraints of Quine's confirmation-holism. 
 
Before we will give a definition that meets this condition, we shall follow Quine and 
change the perspective on the problem. Until now we have viewed the problem from 
within, as did the Quine of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951). We were concerned with 
the epistemic value of my experience, my observations and experiments; we were asking: 
Which of the sentences I assent to are confirmed or disconfirmed in light of this or that 
experience? Quine's confirmation-holism has a normative dimension: I am permitted to 
retain sentence (1), or sentence (2), in the light of any experience whatsoever.15 
 
In the decade following the publication of "Two Dogmas" Quine externalized his holism 
and thus his criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Ever since Word and Object 
(1960), Quine no longer viewed speakers from the inner perspective but from without.16 
The epistemologically normative discussion no longer is pivotal. Instead of being 
concerned with the justification of a given sentence in the light of certain experiments or 
observations, we now confine attention to the description of the verbal reactions of 
speakers to external stimuli. Claims about epistemic justification are replaced by 
behaviouristic descriptions. 
 
This change of perspective does not alter the nature of the holistic problem, however; the 
problem just appears in a different guise. In its new guise the problem no longer appears to 
be one about justification but one about causal relations. Talk about causes replaces talk 
about epistemic reasons. 
                                                 
15  The Quine/Duhem thesis can be seen to have an additional normative dimension once it is realized that it 
recommends to scientists not to follow the rules set by reductionism (or operationalism), but to handle 
their language in more liberal ways and if necessary even to reject some of their definitions. In the light of 
the Quine/Duhem thesis Einstein was fully justified in rejecting some of the putatively analytic (because 
stipulated) equations from Newtonian physics. 




Again, Quine considers and subsequently rejects an attempt to explicate analyticity. This 
time the explicans is called "stimulus-analytic" instead of "confirmation-analytic":  
 
(D1s) A sentence is stimulus-analytic if the speaker assents to it come what may (i.e. if 
the speaker is disposed to assent to the sentence under any stimulations, or 
alternatively, if no conceivable stimulation could prompt the speaker to dissent 
from the sentence).17  
 
This definition results from the original definition (D1c) through a change of perspective, 
viz. by means of replacements of the following kinds: 
 
confirmation-analytic     stimulus-analytic 
I (from within)     the speaker (from without) 
to confirm      to prompt assent 
to be permitted to retain    to remain disposed to assent 
the sentence      to the sentence. 
 
Since in both definitions one and the same idea is expressed in slightly different ways three 
times over, I would now like to render them less cumbersome even if we thereby lose some 
of the nuances: 
 
(D2c) A sentence is confimation-analytic if the sentence is confirmed and if no 
conceivable experience would refute it.  
 
(D2s) A sentence is stimulus-analytic if the speaker assents to the sentence and if no 
conceivable stimulation would prompt the speaker to dissent from it.  
 
It should now be evident that the first definition expresses, in the terms of normative 
epistemology, the same that the second definition expresses in behaviourist-descriptive 
                                                 
17  Quine [WO]:66. 
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vocabulary. In the next section we shall see how Quine undermines the new, behaviourist-




IV. Quine's criticism from without 
According to Quine the definition (D2s), just as its counterpart (D2c), is too comprehensive 
to serve as an adequate explication of the concept of analyticity. In order to drive this point 
home, Quine presents us with a rather silly-looking example. No conceivable stimulation 
will prompt a normal speaker to dissent from the sentence 
 
(3) There have been black dogs.18  
 
Whatever course her experience may take, the speaker's background theory will make her 
disposed to affirm that there have been black dogs. Although it may sound a little 
preposterous to call assumptions about dogs theoretical (which is why we shall turn to 
another example in due course), Quine's point seems clear. Once more his criticism is based 
on the Quine/Duhem thesis which this time, however, is not conceived from within 
(confirmation-holism) but from without (as what I will call stimulus-holism): 
 
Whether a speaker does or does not assent to a given sentence does not always 
causally depend on the momentary stimulation of the speaker. There are sentences 
(from the center of the speaker's theory) for which there is no pattern of stimulation 
that is causally relevant to the speaker's verdict on the sentence.19 
 
In contrast to its epistemologically normative predecessor this version of Quine's thesis is 
purely descriptive; it makes use of causal notions instead of normative notions (like 
                                                 
18  Quine [WO]:66. 
19  Compare, for example, Quine [WO]:64. 
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justification, confirmation, etc.) It refers to speakers in the third person and not in the first 
person. That means that the thesis of stimulus-holism results from confirmation-holism by 
means of the same substitutions that transformed the definition of confirmation-analyticity 
into the definition of stimulus-analyticity. 
 
This parallel suggests that Quine's original criticism (directed against the explanatory 
adequacy of confirmation-analyticity) can be rephrased accordingly so as to apply with 
equal force after the outer perspective has been adopted. The concept of stimulus-
analyticity is too comprehensive to capture our explicandum. Let us go back to our first 
example, which does more justice to the philosophical power behind Quine's criticism than 
his own example concerning black dogs. The following sentence was stimulus-analytic for 
Goethe without being analytic in the intuitive sense: 
 
(1) The sun's white light is homogeneous (i.e., it is not composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour).  
 
No conceivable stimulation would have prompted Goethe to dissent from this sentence.20 
And yet, Goethe would not have conceived of his dispute with the Newtonians as a mere 
struggle about words. On the contrary, he was convinced to use the words contained in (1) 
in just the same way as his opponents. 
 
We should be a bit more explicit about a Quinean notion which plays a crucial role behind 
the stage of our reasoning from the outer perspective: the notion of prompted verdict (i.e., 
of prompted dissent or prompted assent). The notion is a causal, not a temporal notion. A 
stimulus is said to prompt a speaker to, say, dissent from a sentence if the speaker dissents 
from the sentence, not only after being stimulated, but also, because of the stimulus in 
question.21 
 
                                                 
20  For present purposes, it does not matter whether this is ultimately a caricature of the historical Goethe. 
21  See Quine [WO]:32-37; compare [WO]:62-64. 
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Let us look at an example. If the speaker dissents from a sentence such as 
 
(4) The crocuses are out,22 
 
then this can be due to present stimulation, deriving from the sad, colourless state of the 
speaker's garden. (In such case the stimulation does prompt the speaker to dissent from the 
sentence). But it can also happen that the speaker dissents from the sentence while sitting in 
front of the fireplace; in this case some pyromanical stimulation precedes the speaker's 
verdict without causing it; it does not prompt the verdict in question, and is called therefore 
irrelevant by Quine23 (more explicitly: irrelevant to the sentence (4); after all, that very 
stimulation is most relevant to the sentence 'There is a fire in the fireplace'). 
 
What is the true cause for a speaker's verdict in case the verdict is not prompted by present 
stimulation? Answer: background information. In our example, the speaker (sitting in front 
of the fireplace) remembers having looked out unsuccessfully for crocuses in the garden; or 
alternatively, he realizes that it is not yet the season for crocuses. 
 
Background information governs a lot of our everyday verbal behaviour. And in the 
theoretical sciences its role is still greater. Only a few of our verdicts on claims from the 
theoretical sciences are caused by present stimulation alone. (This elite class of claims is 
what Quine calls the observation sentences24). Most of the scientific verdicts are not caused 
by present stimulation alone; background information and background assumptions play a 
most prominent part in causing what scientist say. 
 
                                                 
22  Quine's example, see [WO]:36. 
23  See Quine [WO]:36. 
24  See Quine [WO]:40-42. 
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I hope that our digression into Quinean thinking about the different sort of causes for a 
speaker's behaviour has helped us to see more clearly why it is that Goethe's affirmative 
verdict on the scientific sentence: 
 
(1) The sun's white light is homogeneous (i.e., it is not composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour), 
 
is not caused by any conceivable stimulation whatsoever. Goethe assents to the sentence 
because it is central in his thinking about colours and light—he assents to it come what 
may. The sentence is stimulus-analytic in Goethe's idiolect without being analytic in the 
intuitive sense. 
 
Up to this point I am in agreement with Quine. Adopting the inner perspective, I am 
convinced by his confirmation-holistic case against the concept of confirmation-analyticity. 
Adopting the outer perspective, I am convinced by his stimulus-holistic case against the 
concept of stimulus-analyticity. Both concepts are, for structurally the same reasons, too 
comprehensive to capture what we call "analytic". 
 
Before I will set out my own strategy to answer Quine's holism-based criticism of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, I wish to make some clarifying remarks about the dialectical 
situation. 
 
First, I have presented Quine's criticism twice in parallel fashion, from the normative inner 
as well as the behaviourist outer perspective. The criticism does not essentially depend on 
Quine's endorsement of behaviourism. If he had stayed with the original presentation of his 
criticism (from the inner perspective), no one would have thought of accusing Quine of 
basing his meaning scepticism on an all too extreme form of behaviourism.25 This is the 
main reason why I have chosen to compare those two perspectives in the present paper. I 
want to convince you that Quine's reasoning against analyticity, synonymy, and meaning 
                                                 
25  For a similar line see Harman [ItTM]:22/3. 
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does not depend on the outer (behaviourist) perspective which is usually associated with 
Quine. Quine's best points against analyticity (which is our topic in the present paper) 
survive the change of perspective.26 They have to be taken seriously even by those who do 
not wish to think in behaviourist terms at all. 
 
Second, Quine's criticism is primarily directed against those analytic sentences that contain 
theoretical terms.27 As our ideas about myons, quarks, etc. are certainly not innate, no 
Chomskyan theory about innate structures of language and thought can serve as an antidote 
against Quine's criticism, no matter what the details of such a theory might be. 
 
(And what about the sentence 'All bachelors are unmarried'? Answer: Sentences of this 
kind are none of Quine's concern. He is ready to concede that there is a criterion according 
to which sentences of these more mundane kinds qualify as analytic28). 
 
Third, contrary to a wide-spread misunderstanding, Quine's criticism of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction goes further than his criticism of the concept of translation.29 
One may be able to provide a well-defined conception of analyticity without having any 
means to subvert Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. The converse situation 
is ruled out, though. Anyone who regards translation as well-defined, and hence maintains 
that there are interlinguistic synonymies (between arbitrary languages L1 and L2), is a 
fortiori bound to claim to have a concept of intralinguistic synonymy (just let L1 = L2) that 
would allow her to introduce a concept of analyticity (p is analytic if it is intralinguistically 
synonymous to 'q  q'; see [WO]:65). In contrast, the concept of analyticitythough 
affording a concept of intralinguistic synonymy (p and q are intralinguistically 
synonymous if 'p  q' is analytic; see [WO]:65)does not provide us with a notion of 
                                                 
26  Similar remarks apply to Quine's best points against (intralinguistic) synonymy. 
27  See Quine [TDiR]:271 and Putnam [AS]:62. 
28  See Quine [RoR]:78-80, [TDiR]:270/1. Cf. as well Quine [CLT]:129. 
29  See Müller [SA]:§5.5 - §5.6. 
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interlinguistic synonymy (because 'p  q' will be nonsense whenever p and q do not 
belong to the same language30). 
 
This means: anyone who intends to oppose Quine's meaning scepticism must anyway 
exploit resources that allow us to distinguish between analytic and synthetic sentences. 
Thus, as economical considerations suggest, we are well-advised to begin by explaining 
analyticity. This is what we shall do in the next section. 
 
 
V. Two improved definitions 
It is time for the good news that I promised in the beginning. In my view, Quine's criticism, 
whether it be conceived from within or from without, does not rule out the possibililty to 
improve upon the definitions we have considered so as to ensure that they yield the correct 
results—even if the constraints are operative which holism imposes. 
 
I shall first present such an improvement upon the definition of stimulus-analyticity: 
 
(D3s) A sentence p is narrowly stimulus-analytic if for all sentences t (e.g. sentences 
which are possible candidates for the speaker's background theories) and for all 
conceivable patterns of stimulation  holds: if and only if the speaker was 
prompted by  to dissent from sentence t then  would likewise prompt the 
speaker to dissent from the conjunction 'p & t'.31  
 
It is fairly easy to see that all narrowly stimulus-analytic sentences are also stimulus-
analytic in the sense of definition (D2s). As we shall see shortly, however, the converse 
does not hold. According to definition (D3s), narrowly stimulus-analytic sentences are 
sentences that, taken in isolation, do not say anything about reality in that they will not gain 
dissent under any conceivable stimulation. But neither do they say anything about reality 
                                                 
30  See Quine [PoT]:53. 
31  A further ramification of the definition is suggested in Müller [SA]:§9.27. 
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when embedded in theoretical contexts. If a sentence that is embedded in arbitrary contexts 
(by being conjoined with arbitrary sentences t) has no effects on the range of stimulations 
that prompt a speaker to assent to, or dissent from, the embedding contexts, then this 
sentence is devoid of any factual content. In short, the sentence is analytic in the intuitive 
sense. 
 
In order to show how the improved definition is supposed to work I want to go back to our 
well-known example from Goethe's idiolect: 
 
(1) The sun's white light is homogeneous (i.e., it is not composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour).  
 
The sentence should not be classified as analytic in the intuitive sense; and it does not 
qualify as narrowly stimulus-analytic either, just as desired. 
 
To prove this, we have to name a stimulus wich is irrelevant to a certain sentence t (when t 
is taken in isolation) and yet suffices to prompt Goethe's dissent from the conjunction: 
 
(5) The sun's white light is homogeneous, and t. 
 
What sort of stimulation might have the desired properties? Let us try the very stimulations 
which derive from Newton's prismatic experiments. As we have seen in section II, 
Newton's experimental findings do not force us to dissent from Goethe's sentence (1) (when 
taken in isolation). Neither do they force us to assent to Newtonian talk about rays  of light 
(which is, as we have seen, far too abstract for being determined by experience alone); 
neither do they force us into assent to any other item from the list of Newton's background 
assumptions (e.g., as to disturbing factors; see section II). 
 
Let us repeat these points from the outer perspective. Observing Goethe's verbal behaviour 




(1) The sun's white light is homogeneous, 
 
and dissents from some of Newton's background assumptions such as: 
 
(6) There exist rays of light (which are extended in one spatial dimension only); 
(7) Darkness plays no genuine causal role in the prismatic experiments (i.e., when 
you perform these experiments in a dark room, then your results will be pure 
and undisturbed).  
 
So much about Goethe's actual verdicts on the sentences (1), (6), and (7). Are these verdicts 
prompted by stimulations that derive from the prismatic experiments? Not at all. I want to 
claim that no possible stimulus is sufficiently strong for prompting Goethe to assent to (1) 
or to dissent from (6) and (7). That Goethe's affirmative verdict on sentence (1) is not 
prompted by any conceivable stimulation whatsoever was one of our results in section IV. 
Let me briefly repeat that point for Goethe's negative verdicts on sentences (6) and (7). 
What you see in the prismatic experiments does not force you to dissent from claims as to 
the existence of rays of light, as we have already seen from the inner perspective. From the 
outer perspective, then, we may say: Goethe dissented from Newton's background 
idealization not on the strength of present stimulation, but due to careful philosophical 
analysis.32 
 
And the same holds good for Goethe's negative verdict on Newton's assumption as to 
disturbing factors. Both Goethe and Newton have been stimulated by the same prismatic 
experiments. They disagreed (about the causal role of light and darkness) not due to 
different stimulation, but because they wanted to opt for different theoretical unities. 
Goethe dissented from sentence (7) because this was the way he was able to save his 
sentence (1) from being refuted by Newtonian experimentation. Newton, on the other hand, 
may be said to have assented to (7) for reasons of theoretical economy. 
 
                                                 
32  See Goethe, [LA] I 5, §290 - §298. 
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To sum up what we have said so far, in Goethe's idiolect (as well as in Newton's idiolect) 
there is no relevant stimulation sufficiently strong for prompting the verdicts on each of the 
sentences (1), (6), (7). The situation alters dramatically when we conjoin our three 
sentences. Conjoining sentences may increase semantic mass, says Quine.33 To put it less 
metaphorically, stimulations that were irrelevant to each of the conjuncts may become 
relevant to the conjunction as a whole. (That is the positive part of the Quine/Duhem 
thesis). And my next claim is that this is exactly what happens when we form the 
conjunction of the three sentences we have been considering seperately up to now: 
 
(8) The sun's white light is homogeneous (i.e., it is not composed of rays of light 
that differ in colour). And there exist rays of light. And darkness plays no 
genuine causal role in the prismatic experiments. 
 
You do not have to consult background assumptions if you want to find your verdict on this 
conjunction; the conjunction can be tested empirically. And indeed, when you perform 
some of Newton's prismatic experiments, then you are forced to dissent from (8). Both 
Newton and Goethe agreed on this; both of them were disposed to dissent from (8) on the 
strength of prismatic stimulation; they disagreed only as to the appropriate—unprompted—
verdicts on the conjuncts in (8): Goethe assented to the first conjunct and dissented from 
the second and the third one; Newton opted the other way round. This gives us the clue for 
applying our definition, which run as follows: 
 
(D3s) A sentence p is narrowly stimulus-analytic if for all sentences t and for all 
conceivable patterns of stimulation  holds: if and only if the speaker was 
prompted by  to dissent from the conjunction 'p & t', then  would likewise 
prompt the speaker to dissent from sentence t.  
 
Goethe's sentence (1) is not narrowly stimulus-analytic in the sense of this definition. 
Prismatic stimulation prompted Goethe to dissent from the conjunction (8) (playing the role 
                                                 
33  See Quine [PoT]:17. 
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of 'p & t') without prompting him to dissent from Newton's background assumptions t.34 
The prismatic experiments allowed Goethe to dissent from the Newtonian background (6) 
& (7); they would have allowed him equally well to assent to it.35 
 
In the last sentence I have switched perspective and presented the matter from within. 
Thereby nothing essential has been changed. For my behaviouristic definition (D3s) has a 
counterpart formulated from within: 
 
(D3c) A sentence p is narrowly confirmation-analytic if for all sentences t (e.g. 
sentences which are possible candidates for my background theories) and for all 
conceivable experiences  holds: if and only if  told against, then  would 
likewise tell against sentence t (i.e. if and only if  was evidence telling against 
'p & t', then it would also be evidence telling against t).  
 
This definition tightens the criterion given by (D2c) in just the same way as (D3s) tightens 
the criterion given by (D2s). Quine repudiated the original criteria on the basis of both 
confirmation- and stimulus-holism. The concepts of narrow confirmation-analyticity and 
narrow stimulus-analyticity cannot be repudiated on these grounds. On the contrary, both 
these definitions were precisely designed to cope with holism. In this way, Quine's main 
argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction has successfully been answered. 
Contrary to what Quine suggested, the Quine/Duhem thesis does not afford a compelling 
reason to give up the distinction. 
 
 
                                                 
34  In our example the background t is again formed by a conjunction: by the conjunction (6) & (7). Strictly 
speaking, I have not shown that the prismatic stimulations are not causally relevant to this conjunction. (I 
have only shown them to be irrelevant to each of its conjuncts). But the additional step is easily taken 
because the conjuncts (6) and (7) have nothing essential in common. Only after conjoining still another 
conjunct, i.e., (1), critical semantical mass is reached. See also the next sentence in the main text. 
35  Elsewhere I have tried to prove in similar fashion that Einstein's credo (2) from section II is not analytic in 
the sense of my definition (D3s), see [SA]:§9.20 - §9.21. Due to Hans Rott's insightful criticism I have 
come to realize that my attempts of dealing with that difficult example have not succeeded. 
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VI. From observation to theory 
Which sentences, then, are narrowly stimulus- or confirmation-analytic? Logical 
tautologies and mathematical theorems are the first candidates for analyticity that come to 
mind. If such sentences are to be narrowly stimulus-analytic (to concentrate on one of our 
two notions), logicians, mathematicians and their followers would have to behave in certain 
ways. Do they? I have spelled out elsewhere that we can expect them to—given certain 
minimal assumptions concerning the speakers' rationality, which derive from an application 
of Quine's principle of charity.36 
 
Logic and mathematics aside, are there any other cases of narrow analyticity in the sense of 
my definitions? Are there analytic sentences in physics? It would be beyond the scope of 
this paper to answer this question in sufficient detail on the basis of an actual example. 
When one tries to answer the question from the outer perspective, one would have to 
investigate into the actual verbal behaviour of physicists. What is needed, then, is a 
linguistic field study at the physics departments. The philosopher of science can at best 
formulate more or less reasonable assumptions, or hypotheses, as to the result of such field 
studies. (His job is not so much to find out which sentences from physics are analytic, due 
to the physicists' actual speech behaviour; rather his job is to give this question a clear 
sense). 
 
The situation is different when the question concerning analyticity in physics is posed from 
the inner perspective. Here is the place for normative philosophy of science. Given our 
notion of narrow confirmation-analyticity, we can discuss whether or not it is reasonable to 
organize our physical theory in such a way that a certain part of it is analytically true, and 
thus, devoid of empirical content in any possible context. Although this is a normative 
business, it would be indeed irresponsible, and risky, if the philosopher of science tried to 
pursue it without being informed about what is actually going on in physics. My advice is, 
of course, to switch perspective from time to time. 
                                                 




As should have become clear, I do not feel confident at the present moment to claim 
anything definite concerning analyticity in physics. Still I should like to conclude this paper 
in a spirit slightly more constructive than that. So let us indulge ourselves and speculate a 
little. My hinch is that Carnap was right in claiming that the analytic part of a theory t can 
be extracted from the theory by means of its Ramsey-sentence 'rams(t)' even if the 
Quine/Duhem thesis is being assumed.37 Just as Carnap maintained, it may well hold for 
sufficiently complex theories t that the conditional: 
 
rams(t)  t, 
 
is analytic. In my terminology, Carnap's conditional might prove narrowly stimulus- and 
confirmation-analytic. If this is so, then the theory t can be dissected into two parts, a 
conceptual component and the remainder that expresses the theory's factual content. For, t 
is logically equivalent to: 
 
 (rams(t)  t) & rams (t). 
 
This might allow us to bridge the gap between observation and theory that we remarked 
upon in the beginning. The Ramsey-sentence 'rams(t)' of a given theory t results from the 
elimination of the theoretical terms of t, yet it has the same empirical consequences as t 
itself (Ramsey's Theorem38). That is to say, one can directly observe the empirical evidence 
that speaks in favour of 'rams(t)'; and anyone who has made such observations would be 
permitted to infer, by means of the analytic sentence 
 
 rams(t)  t, 
 
                                                 
37 For the following see Carnap [PFoP]:270-272; see also my detailed discussion in [SA]:§11.4 - §11.12, 
which is far from being conclusive. 
38  For the proof see Stegmüller [TE]/1:409-411. 
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to the theory t. (On this view, abduction would turn out to be a conceptually mediated 
inference39). 
 
Even if all this is right, the transition from observation to theory is not validated when 
applied to individual sentences taken in isolation. In general, t will be a highly complex 
conjunction of a large number of sentences which contain a variety of theoretical terms and 
which cannot individually be confirmed by any observation. This means: Quine's holism-
based criticism of analytic reductionism still stands. 
 
Similarly, the analytic sentences will not be sacrosanct. Speakers who proceed from one 
theory to its successor may well give up their analytic sentencessay, in the course of a 
scientific revolution. The speakers will then accept a new theory t* that is not only 
incompatible with the old theory t (just as in the case of any belief revision) but also with 
the weaker analytic sentence 'rams(t)  t'. In such a case, then, the belief revision is 
accompanied by a linguistic change. This is not the normal case, though. 
 
How is it possible that in the context of Quine's holistic assumptions we seem able to 
clearly distinguish between belief revision and linguistic change, if according to holism 
everything is connected with everything else? Let me make two comments in response. 
 
First, holism does not imply that nothing can be distinguished from anything else. For 
example, it does not imply that a theoretical whole has the same properties as the totality 
that results if one conjoins a further sentence: in the course of conjoining sentences critical 
semantical mass may result, as Quine would say; this is the positive aspect of the 
Quine/Duhem thesis.40 It was precisely this aspect that we exploited in defining narrow 
confirmation- and stimulus-analyticity. Quine's mistake was to overlook the potential of his 
own doctrine. 
                                                 
39  For some details, see Müller [SA]:§12.3. 




Second, we have reduced the concept of narrow stimulus-analyticity to the totality of the 
verbal dispositions of individual speakers at a given time. (Admittedly, these dispositions 
cannot all be discerned at that time, but they are nonetheless there even if not actualized). 
Such totality of dispositions concerns the wildest combinations of sentences. Naturally, the 
individual dispositions change continuously. (For example, someone who learns that a 
remote relative got married will have dispositions to react on an utterance of 'There is a 
bachelor' other than those she had before; this alone does not amount to a linguistic 
change). 
 
But we can extract from the dispositional chaos some fixed pointse.g. the narrowly 
stimulus-analytic sentences whose sudden rejection will alter the totality of dispositions in 
fundamental ways entirely different from the normal course of things. If in the idiolect of 
the speaker at some point different sentences are narrowly stimulus-analytic than before, 
then her idiolect has changed.41 
 
                                                 
41  Does such linguistic change have to be accompanied by belief revision, as in the case of scientific 
revolutions? No. Consider a speaker who systematically substitutes the terms 'electron' and 'proton' for 
each other throughout his theory and thus arrives at a permutation 'perm(t)' of his original theory t. This 
substitution does not effect a change concerning empirical content, as 'rams(t)' and 'rams(perm(t))' are 
logically equivalent. However, the previously analytic conditional 'rams(t)t' will be replaced by the 
conditional 'rams(t)perm(t)' which is inconsistent with the former. I hasten to add that this sort of 
changing meanings does not occur in actual practice. Even if a student of physics comes up in an exam 
with a permutation of our actual theory and tries to excuse himself by claiming that the permuted theory is 
empirically equivalent and thus equally well justified—then he will still fail the exam (I predict). Why 
would it be justified to not let him pass the exam although he has not claimed anything that is empirically 
false? My answer is that he should be excluded from academic degrees becauses he uses some theoretical 
terms in a wrong way; he has not shown a correct understanding of our physical language. 
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This last answer is given from the outer perspective insofar as it relates to stimulations, 
dispositions etc. and is couched in terms of narrow stimulus-analyticity. I leave it to the 
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